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MARIA MÄKELÄ 
(Tampere) 
Masters of Interiority 
Figural Voices as Discursive Appropriators and as Loopholes 
in Narrative Communication 
Abstract 
The article addresses the peculiarities of figural voice in consciousness 
representation and the disruptive effect that this voice has on our narrato-
logical readings of minds and of narrative transmission. Instead of taking 
the natural narrative as my starting point, I base my arguments on a dia-
chronic reconsideration of figural voices in literary fiction. First, I will ar-
gue that the seeds of the ´unnaturalnessµ of figural voice are already 
planted in epistolary narration. The psychologically ´naturalµ (mimetic) 
reading of fictional minds³favored by both classical and cognitive narra-
tology³will be shown to foreground the ´unrestrainedµ expression of 
thought and emotion via figural voice. Yet the conventions of conscious-
ness representation bear in themselves the traces of mediacy (´diegesisµ): 
conventional frames of verbalization; intentional structure; communicative 
features. I will continue by tracing the evolution of this charged relation-
ship between mediacy and immediacy in the third person narrative context 
and in instances of focalization and stylistically unmarked free indirect 
discourse. The key argument of this article concerns both narrative as well 
as thematic conventions. Characters who master their own interiority by 
appropriating narratorial conventions form a recurrent motive in the de-
velopment of the modern novel. This literary convention is³ and at the 
same time, peculiarly, is not³in contradiction with the hierarchization 
and the naturalization of literary discourse prevalent in narratology. The 
´narrativizing focalizersµ and the like also issue a threat to the currently 
much favoured rhetorical approaches to narrative fiction, since verbalized 
fictional minds highlight the nature of consciousness representation as 
incommunicable communication. Finally, encouraged by the epistolary 
digression, The Princess of Clèves, Madame Bovary and Coetzee·s Disgrace, I 
wish to set forth a narratological take on consciousness representation as a 
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derivative of, not speech, but writing (with a faint nod towards Bakhtin and 
Derrida).  
Introduction: Narratology and the Easy Access Fallacy 
Narratorial voices in literary fiction may be strange³as demonstrated in 
many articles of the current volume³but never quite in the same manner 
as figural voices are. Here I mainly refer to the unuttered, internal ´voic-
esµ of story-internal literary characters that are conveyed to us through 
multiple means of consciousness representation. The long history of dis-
course narratology attests to the fact that the figural voice is even more 
perplexing than the narrative voice. Yet this is strangeness in respect to 
linguistic and cognitive based theoretical categories, not strangeness before 
the reading audience³quite the contrary, a lay reader is perfectly com-
fortable with passages of narrative literature exposing a hidden discursive 
agency of a story-internal character. This type of narration³third-person 
past-tense narratorial report intermingled with recurrent outbursts of 
characters· language³has been exhausted by popular fiction from hard-
boiled crime stories to Harlequin romances. Nothing strange here. Yet, 
such double-voiced or double-intentional narrative discourse has inspired 
some of the most prominent narratologists (most notably McHale 1978a, 
Cohn 1978 and Fludernik 1993), as well as evoked some illustrious theo-
retical controversies (e. g. Banfield 1982 vs. McHale 1983; Miller 1988, 
Seltzer 1984 & Bender 1987 vs. Cohn 1999 [1995]). Despite of the fact 
that this mode has been through several narratological redefinitions and 
contestations, it is still best known by the name of free indirect discourse 
(FID), which has its origins in the linguistic ´speech categoriesµ (cf. Pal-
mer 2004)³long since discarded as insufficient and replaced by contextu-
al (McHale 1978a) and cognitive (Fludernik 1993) approaches. The persis-
tence of the linguistics-originated term perhaps hints at the unsettling 
effect that this mode has on the relationship between verbalization (lan-
guage) and discursive agency (´mindµ).  
 The paradigm shift in narratology from classical, linguistic-based mo-
del building to the postclassical variety of approaches has not significantly 
altered the narratological take on figural voice. Are you reading the narra-
tor·s voice or the character·s voice, or both at the same time? A consider-
able amount of narratological work has been dedicated to isolating the 
alleged ´voicesµ of narrative agents from the discourse of narrative fiction. 
In order to put one·s finger on the discursive ´selfµ of the character a dili-
gent student of narrative discourse immediately starts to dissect the dis-
course and label some parts as narratorial (the informative, the authorial), 
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other parts as figural (the colloquial, the expressive). However deeply 
rooted in narratology this separation procedure might be, one question 
remains largely unanswered and even unaddressed in both classical and 
postclassical studies: whence all the ambivalence between the narratorial-
objective and the figural-subjective?  
 Narrative instances that continue to trigger the narratological imagina-
tion are those that seem not just to represent alternating voices, but also 
to amalgamate narratorial report with the unuttered voice of the figural con-
sciousness. Even if we were to ultimately ´reestablishµ individual figural 
and narratorial voices from ambiguously voiced discourse, would not the-
se individuated discursive selves bear in themselves the traces of the one-
time discursive union?  
 Now I  must  hasten to add that  the narratively  and thematically  pro-
ductive effects of this ambivalence have, indeed, been widely studied as 
narratorial functions.  Roy  Pascal·s  seminal  study  on  FID  (The Dual Voice, 
1977) considered the mode mainly as a vehicle for either narratorial empa-
thy or irony, and this well-argued interpretation was echoed in several 
subsequent studies (e.g. Cohn 1978, Aczel 1998, Gunn 2004). Monika Flu-
dernik·s massive study on speech and thought representation (1993) con-
tinues in the same vein of regarding ambivalence of discursive agency 
mainly as narratorial mimicry: in Fludernik·s theory, figural voice is but a 
´linguistic hallucinationµ and reducible to the narratorial voice. Yet how 
about figural functions? Can we assign any discursive intentions to the silent 
reflector-characters whose inner flow we nonetheless ´hearµ? Another 
strand in studies of free indirect (or just fuzzy) discourse, the one that 
foregrounds the figural component, has been dominated by ideological 
readings: Kathy Mezei (1996) sees an emancipatory potential in FID as a 
mode which allows the characters to ´have their say,µ more supported 
than restricted by narratorial framing; conversely, the Foucauldian readers 
of FID such as Mark Seltzer (1984), D. A. Miller (1988) and John Bender 
(1987) regard the mode as a form of ideological oppression, and as inher-
iting a biased power relation for the benefit of the authoritative narrator 
who is able to survey the characters· mental life (especially inner dis-
course) with its non-reciprocal gaze.  
 What, all in all, seems to characterize those approaches³whether they 
foreground narratorial functions or emphasize the (emancipatory or op-
pressive) transparency of characters· internal discourse³is to automatical-
ly regard narratorial discourse as a representative of narrative mediacy and 
character·s discourse as an access to the immediate experience or impres-
sion. If we were to take at a face value all the hierarchically driven efforts 
for analyzing narrative discourse during the past four decades, I think we 
could actually agree with the Foucauldian theorists in that the literary 
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character appears, indeed, as an object of narrative-discursive oppression, 
as the unfortunate passive creature at the end of the narrative food chain. 
The roots of this preconception are traceable all the way to Plato-Aristo-
telian distinction between diegesis and mimesis: to the dichotomous concep-
tion that separates telling (narration as mediation) from showing (the ex-
perience of immediacy). 
 The only theorist to fully acknowledge the rhetorical potential of figu-
ral interiority is the one who committed what according to his successors 
seems to be a crucial taxonomic blunder: for Booth, a reflector qualifies as 
an unreliable agent just as any first person narrator³the focalizers of Mrs. 
Dalloway appear in the same record with Holden Caulfield (see Booth 
1991: 493-494, ´A Gallery of Unreliable Narrators and Reflectorsµ). Might 
it even be that this alleged misunderstanding in the theory of narrative 
rhetoric in fact reveals the counter-intuitivity of the Genettean distinction 
between speakers and perceivers? Clearly, Booth is inclined to ascribe 
communicative features to figural internal discourse, but does not really 
address the differences between unreliable narration and unreliable focaliz-
ation; he does not problematize the pseudo-communicative quality of 
consciousness representation. This productive blunder lives on in Tamar 
Yacobi·s formulations on ´fictional mediationµ and unreliability that place 
reflectors and narrators on the same axis of the ´mediation-gapµ, the per-
spectival distance between the fictional mediator and the author (Yacobi 
1981 and 1987). Yet also Yacobi³herself an observant critic of theoreti-
cal ´package-dealingµ (see Yacobi 2001)³settles for the evident (´nat-
uralµ) package-deal as far as the position of the silent reflector/monologist 
is concerned: inner speech in fiction is, by definition, unconsciously commu-
nicative (Yacobi 1987: 338). Yet, one might wonder whether the reader·s 
sense of being led on by a focalizer would not also insinuate rhetorical 
intention.  
 We may also be reminded of Franz K. Stanzel·s classical study on nar-
rative mediacy (1984), where also the character·s perceptual and discursive 
presence has mediating functions: the ´figural narrative situationµ or ´re-
flector-mode narrativeµ defined by Stanzel are narrative instances where 
mediacy brought on by the narratorial voice is replaced by mediacy via 
figural consciousness. However, also Stanzel·s formulations reveal the un-
derlying discordance:  
Realistic presentation of consciousness seems to require the illusion of immedia-
cy, that is, the apparent suspension of mediacy, more than does presentation of 
external events. The modern novel especially shows a very pronounced tendency 
to give the presentation of consciousness the semblance of immediacy, of the un-
edited and the spontaneous. [«] Interior monologue, free indirect style [FID] 
and figural narrative situation, that is, the forms of the reflector-mode and of in-
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ternal perspective, suggest immediacy, that is, the illusion of direct insight into 
the character·s thoughts. (Stanzel 1984: 127) 
Why does Stanzel speak of ´the illusion of immediacy [«] the apparent sus-
pension of mediacyµ without specifying the illusory quality of the mimesis 
of the mind?1 Everything is illusory in fiction; what is it that is specifically 
illusory in our sense of immediacy when reading fictional minds?   
 Stanzel·s most appreciative follower and interpreter Monika Fludernik 
also pays abundant attention to the ´evocation of figural voice.µ Yet both 
her theoretical assertions and textual analyses are inclined to downplay the 
discursive agency of a figural consciousness and reduce multi-voicedness 
to narratorial functions of empathy, irony, and stylistic parody. In her vo-
cabulary of ambiguous discursive agency, both ´reflectorizationµ and ´fig-
uralizationµ are varieties of narratorial mimicry or appropriation of figural 
(expressive and deictically marked; individual, collective, or impersonal) 
voice (see Fludernik 1996: 178-221). Indeed, she dispenses with the dual-
voice approach on the level of language and narrative technique and con-
siders ambiguity of voices only an interpretive effect (see, e.g. Fludernik 
1993: 322-356). Yet one of the cornerstones of Fludernikian natural narra-
tology (1996) is an unlimited access to figural experience via, among other 
narrative elements, discursive markers of expressivity³qua indicators of 
experientiality. In cognitive terms, the figural narrative situation defined by 
Stanzel requires a deictic shift inside the character·s experiential plane: 
Telling can be dispensed with, readers simply orient themselves to a position 
within the fictional world [«]. Such a reading experience is structured in terms of 
the natural frame of experiencing, which includes the experiences of perception, 
sentiment and cognition. Real-life parameters are transcended. Instead of merely 
observing and guessing at other people·s experiences, frames naturally available 
only for one·s own experience become accessible for application to a third per-
son. (Fludernik 1996: 48) 
These ´frames [«]  available  [«]  for  one·s  own experienceµ must  surely  
include discursive frames as well. Yet both Fludernik as well as other cog-
nitive narratologists who emphasize the importance of a deictic shift for 
the readerly immersion in the figural experience tend to treat the discur-
sive shift from narratorial to figural as a mere catalyst. However, the ulti-
mate frame for interpretation is, and remains, discursive.  
 For Fludernik, the natural frames of TELLING (domination of narrato-
rial discourse) and EXPERIENCING (immersion in figural experience) are 
basic units on the level of reading; she does not, however, consider the 
possible overlapping between these two frames in cases when the reader is 
                      
1  Alongside with Stanzel, also Fludernik (1996: 48) refers to the reading of fictional minds as 
the ´willing suspension of disbeliefµ.   
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confronted with a figural narrative situation that displays diegetic qualities or ap-
propriates narratorial functions. In the notoriously double-voiced narration of 
Madame Bovary (1857), we find a sentence illustrating Emma·s restlessness 
after Léon has left her alone with the stultifying company of her disap-
pointing husband and the rest of the Yonville:  
(1) Now the bad days of Tostes came back again. This time she thought herself 
far more unhappy: for she was experienced in sorrow, with the certainty that 
it would never end. Any woman who had imposed such great sacrifices on herself could 
well be permitted a few fancies.2 She bought a Gothic prie-dieu, and in one month 
she spent fourteen francs on lemons for cleaning her nails [«] (115; italics 
mine)  
The cited passage opens with an undisputable occurrence of psycho-
narration (indirect ´thought reportµ; see Cohn 1978: 21²57; Palmer 2004: 
75²80), indicated by a linguistic marker of indirectness (´she thought her-
self...µ).3 However, already the second sentence leaves the intentional 
stance somewhat ambivalent: who is of the opinion that Emma is ´experi-
enced in sorrowµ? When we reach the third sentence (´Any woman 
who...µ) we are ready to give up insistence on linguistically marked speech 
categories, since what we are dealing with must be free indirect discourse 
camouflaged as narratorial judgement.  
 Already the classical definitions of FID (by, for example, McHale 
1978a and 1983, Pascal 1977, Ginsburg 1982) include such instances of 
discursive double-intention as in the sentence ´Any woman who...µ: the 
utterance does not display any overt, linguistic or expressive markers of 
the character·s inner discourse but reads as a subjective construction of 
the storyworld only when considered in its narrative and thematic context 
(the extralinguistic markers that guide our contextual interpretation of the 
discursive agencies or voices behind the surface of language). After the 
breakthrough of ¶Natural· and cognitive narratology, perennial questions 
raise their heads: Why give the subjective perspective of a character the 
                      
2  In the French original: ´Une femme qui s·était imposé de si grands sacrifices pouvait bien 
passer des fantaisiesµ. (217)  
3 As to Cohn·s term ´psycho-narrationµ and Palmer·s notion of ´thought reportµ it should be 
noted that both theorists in fact express a distrust of figural verbalizations of experience, 
which is partly in tune with my own assertions. For Cohn, it is precisely the narrator-
dominated psycho-narration that allows for the most penetrating look ´insideµ fictional 
minds since the mode is independent of figural capacities of verbalization and introspection 
(Cohn 1978: 46, 56, 139²140). One crucial point in Palmer·s critique of the classical speech 
category approach is the rehabilitation of the indirect modes of consciousness representation 
that, according to Palmer, are capable of rendering the non-verbalized component of fiction-
al minds: for Palmer, consciousness representation involves ´the whole mindµ in its ´social 
and physical context.µ (Palmer 2004: 76)    
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persuasiveness of an objective report? Why must the identification of the 
subject behind the discourse necessarily be based on all sorts of extra evi-
dence? Where is the fictional voice, if not in the utterance itself?  
 I think that it is precisely at the face of such narrative instances as the 
Bovary example above that the cognitive-narratological approaches fall 
short, partly because of their insistence on such natural categories as TEL-
LING and EXPERIENCING, partly because of their conviction that as all 
narratives, also any literary narrative is mainly concerned with qualia, of 
the ´raw feelsµ of an individual, of the ´what is it like to be xµ quality of 
human experience (see esp. Herman 2007: 256²257). In these exhaustive 
approaches to mind and narrative the peculiarities of figural voice dissolve 
into ´naturalµ readings: problematic discursive agency is overlooked in 
favour of establishing a firm experiential plane from which the feeling of 
being-in-the-fictional-world can emanate. Yet there is nothing raw in the 
sentence ´Une femme qui s·était impose de  si  grands  sacrifices  pouvait  
bien passer des fantaisies,µ a sentence, which read in context is wrought 
with subjectivity. We do not enter Emma·s consciousness all the way 
through; instead, we bump into an inner persuasion process, which, being 
verbalized in narrative discourse, comes disturbingly close to resemble an 
objective narratorial report³or even an authorial gnomic statement on 
how things are in  the world.  The passage seems to require  more than an 
alternating application of the TELLING and the EXPERIENCING frame; we 
must appreciate literary narrative·s capacity to activate these frames simul-
taneously³as well as the resultant unreliability of both frames.  
 
In the following, I wish to argue that ambivalence of voices should not 
merely be reduced to either narratorial functions or to a challenge to dig 
out the truth about a character·s truest motives, intentions or emotions. 
Ambiguous discourse may also give rise to figural takeovers that cannot 
be explained away by cognitive or rhetorical approaches. It will be argued 
that it is precisely the multi-layered communicational and discursive struc-
ture of narrative fiction that provokes the violations of that structure; the 
literary hierarchy of voices has inspired the writers as well as the readers to 
explore the nexus between mind, language and narrative in ways that are 
not completely compatible with our everyday cognitive mechanisms of 
understanding the world and each other.  
 I will try to make my point with a simulated diachronic shift in the 
history of literary representation of figural voice. I will start with a couple 
of canonical examples from epistolary narration to highlight the fact that 
figural voice is much more than a literary extension of the theories and 
conceptions concerning the ´real mindµ or human subjectivity in general. 
I argue that, by having recourse to the epistolary first-person forerunners 
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of figural narrative situations, we are able to trace back the literary evolu-
tion of the ´strangenessµ of figural voice-³a strangeness that, at least 
partly, originates from a mind that is both writing and written. From episto-
lary fiction I move on to a very limited corpus of examples displaying am-
bivalent focalization and stylistically unmarked free indirect discourse in 
third person contexts. Fictional minds will be considered as displaying a 
distortedly dualistic angle to literary experientiality: (1) the allegedly repre-
sented consciousnesses appear as discursively mastering their own minds, 
appropriating narratorial functions and thus playing the ´willing suspen-
sion of mediacyµ game on us readers; yet simultaneously (2) such diegetic 
mind games undermine fundamentally the entire mimetic agency of these 
figural consciousnesses and their existence as anything else but writing.  
Epistolary Minds: Mediated Immediacy 
(2) O my dearest Father and Mother, 
LET me write and bewail my miserable hard Fate, tho· I have no Hope that 
what I write will be convey·d to your Hands! ² I have now nothing to do but 
write, and weep, and fear, and pray; and yet, What can I pray for, when God 
Almighty, for my Sins, to be sure, vouchsafes not to hear my Prayers; but 
suffers  me  to  be  a  Prey  to  a  wicked  Violator  of  all  the  Laws  of  God  and  
Man!  ³But,  gracious  Heaven,  forgive  me  my  Rashness!  O  let  me  not  sin  
against thee; for thou best knowest what is fittest for thy poor Handmaid! 
(98) 
Here, to be sure, we have a beautiful exemplar of a fictional figural voice 
in distress³unmediated by any narratorial framing or temporal distance. 
Similarity to an unuttered voice of third person consciousness representa-
tion is made even more evident by the ´eclipse of the confidant,µ a con-
ventional rhetorical move in the epistolary novel: the writer·s (the narra-
tor·s) discourse turns inward and the locus of the receiver (the narratee) 
appears to be empty. As Janet Gurkin Altman notes, such an eclipse is 
likely to occur whenever the letter-writer is going through an emotional 
turbulence. (Altman 1982: 57-59.) In the above example, the disappear-
ance of the audience is made literal since the poor Pamela, kidnapped by 
her tormentor Mr B, will not be able to send the letter to her parents. 
Moreover, the heroine is convinced that even God himself ignores her 
prayers. Yet Pamela·s outburst cannot be considered as completely gratui-
tous, since the feminine master plan, which ultimately dominates over Mr 
%·s  stratagems,  relies  on the fact  that  Pamela  knows Mr B to be reading 
her letters. A gap opens up for a non-mimetic reading of consciousness: 
the immediate distress appears as a discursively mediated fabrication.  
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 The pioneering role of epistolary narration in consciousness represen-
tation has been only fleetingly considered by postclassical narratologists 
such as Fludernik (see 1996: 48), Zunshine (see 2006: 86), or Palmer (see 
2004: 242-243). Moreover, if mentioned at all, epistolary narration·s con-
tribution to the evolution of fictional minds is considered to be it·s allow-
ing of an ´immediate accessµ to figural consciousness. Such a take on the 
epistolary clairvoyance echoes the words of the 18th century masters them-
selves, Samuel Richardson·s famous and triumphant characterization in 
his preface to Clarissa (´the only natural Opportunity [«] of representing 
with any Grace those lively and delicate Impressions which Things pre-
sent are known to make upon the Minds of those affected by themµ; cit. 
McKeon 1997: 259) as well as Samuel Johnson·s praise of Richardson·s 
ability to ´dive into the recesses of the human hearWµ (cit. Watt 1984: 261). 
A notable exception to this psychologically mimetic approach is offered 
by Joe Bray, whose study on the epistolary novel draws out the disconti-
nuity between the perceiving self and the perceived self (Bray 2003: 16 
passim)4; between the distressed captive Pamela and the Pamela who ver-
bally constructs herself as her Lord·s  poor Handmaid.  The outcome is  a  
disturbing mixture of hysterical expressivity and persuasive rhetoric. Ac-
cording to Bray, ´the impossibility and unseizability of the epistolary pre-
sentµ as well as the ´constant interaction between the narrating self and 
the experiencing selfµ in the early modern epistolary fictions foreshadow 
the ambiguous voice and identity games (such as free indirect discourse) 
between the heterodiegetic narrator and the diegetic character displayed by 
later, realist and modernist novels (ibid. 19²28).  
 Indeed, we may notice how some modes as well as recurring themes 
of epistolary narration seem to controvert the entire notion of figural 
voice as immediacy³let alone as quasi-authentic ´experientialityµ³or as 
a simulation of ´raw feels.µ In Richardson·s Pamela, Mr. B. repeatedly re-
fers to Pamela as an ´artful slutµ; in a deceitful letter to Pamela·s father, he 
makes an observation which many interpreters of the novel find to be 
quite apt: ´with all her pretended Simplicity and Innocence, I never knew 
so much romantic Invention  as  she  is  Mistress  ofµ (Pamela, 93). In fact, 
most of the literary letter writers are artful sluts. This can be said even of 
the very trendsetter of epistolary passion, sister Mariana in Guilleragues· 
The Portuguese Letters (Les Lettres Portugaises, 1669), whose verbalized ang-
uishes have served as inspirations and examples for letter writers, both 
fictional and real, for centuries. As Joe Bray remarks, Mariana·s frantically 
                      
4  Also Janet Gurkin Altman·s classical study (1982) dwells on the unnatural aspects of the 
epistolary mode as well as points out some recurrent epistolary homologies between modes 
of writing and thematic patterns.  
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emotional letters to the deceitful lover were read as close simulations of 
´naturalµ feminine passion and as models on how to verbalize unpremedi-
tated sensations (Bray 2003: 29-30). Yet, as Bray goes on to claim, the let-
ters display order in their disorder and reflect distance in their expressivity 
(31-32). And when Mr. B refers to Pamela as a ´mighty letter-writer,µ he 
does not only point to the unnatural volume of those letters but to the im-
probable skill they exhibit in their power to construct and manipulate inte-
riority. Already this narrow evidence suggests that even the early exem-
plary texts of epistolary fiction foreground themselves the linguistic and 
narrative mediacy of the immediate.  
 Yet, in the letters of Pamela and sister Mariana, the verbal mannerisms 
or the discursive façade of an ingénue figure are ultimately all that we 
have³these sentences form the figural interiorities and the literary experi-
entiality that we readers are so keen on capturing. This paradox leads us to 
my central assertion: that the syntheticity of a textualized ´inner voiceµ is 
an elementary part of literary fiction and does not get lost in translation 
from the first person epistolary form to the focalized third person narra-
tion of mainstream psychological realism. The earlier mentioned study by 
Joe Bray examines carefully the shaky relationship between the experienc-
ing self and the writing self and suggests that this shakiness gets trans-
ferred into the ambiguous relationship between the heterodiegetic narrator 
and the experiencing character. However, I think something elementary 
gets lost if we³again³consider the problem of verbalization always to 
come down to the narrator-character controversy; I would claim that the 
figural voice·s internal controversy lives on, just as well in the third person 
context as in the hysterical and yet well-composed voices of epistolary 
heroines. If we take this road (chose to emphasize figural functions over 
narratorial functions) we may conclude that in many narrative instances, 
the most productive ambivalence lies between the ´voiceµ of an unmedi-
ated experience and the unavoidable sense of premeditation brought on 
by language, intentional structure and communicativeness.  
 An illustrative example of bringing this ambivalence to an overtly the-
matic level is Choderlos de Laclos· Les Liaisons dangereuses (1782), where 
the notorious seducer Valmont makes an art of verbally fabricated pas-
sions. In letter No. 70, he describes the production of an emotionally 
charged and seemingly incongruous letter (No. 68) to Madame de Tourvel:  
(3) I have therefore declined her precious friendship and insisted upon my claim 
to the title of lover. Since I am under no illusions as to the real importance 
of securing this title (though it  might appear at first to be a mere quibbling 
about words), I took great pains with my letter and attempted to reproduce 
in it that disorder which alone can portray feeling. I was, at all events, as un-
reasonable as I was capable of being: for there is no showing tenderness 
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without talking nonsense. It is for this reason, it seems to me, that women 
are better writers of love-letters than men. (150) 
Valmont·s calculated evocation of a figural voice and the disclosure of his 
methods form the most crucial metatext for the entire novel: the Richard-
sonian dive ´into the recesses of the heartµ proves a mere illusion pro-
duced by writerly conventions. Furthermore, Valmont·s perception of 
(feminine) epistolary passions seems to suggest that there is always a me-
thod in textual madness; even in the final letter of the hysterical Madame 
de Tourvel, dictated from her death bed and addressed to no one particu-
lar. Her unrestrained flow of thought speaks to Valmont (´Cruel and ma-
lignant man«µ), to her husband (´Return and punish an unfaithful wifeµ) 
and to no one (´Where are the friends that love me, where are they? [«] 
No one dares come near meµ). In Tourvel·s letter, the irrationality of ref-
erence completes the eclipse of the (anonymous) confidant. And yet, it is 
in this letter where we find epistolary expressivity reaching its peak. Here 
we get to one of the greatest paradoxes of consciousness representation: 
how can one express anything without an audience? 
 
Through this intrinsic turn in narrative communication the epistolary nov-
el ushers in a new kind of figural voice. This voice represents a non-com-
municative and yet speaking subject and it comes to be thoroughly con-
ventionalized by later novelistic techniques such as internal focalization, 
free indirect discourse and stream-of-consciousness narration. In terms of 
the narratological easy access fallacy, the expressivity of language gives rise 
to an uncensored figural experience. Yet something gets thrown away with 
the bathwater when narratologists turn from letters to consciousness rep-
resentation: the intentionality behind an utterance, the pseudo-communic-
ative nature of figural voice, the artfulness with which the unuttered emo-
tion, experience or thought is formulated. Yet this ambivalence between 
immediacy and mediacy of expression (between Tourvel and Valmont) is 
already thematized in epistolary fictions: the experiential logic of epistolary 
narration is based on double-dealing between intentional structure (´artµ) 
and free expression (´lifeµ). This controversy is the most salient legacy that 
the epistolary novel of the early modernity has passed on to our days: the 
notion of a constructed and mediated nature of written experience ² not 
that of an immediate and amorphous one.  
 When reading Laclos or Richardson, we may discern how the evoca-
tion of figural immediacy is deconstructed and the entire communicational 
design seems to loop from the rendering of ´trueµ subjectivity back to the 
origins of fictional representation³that is, to authorial design. As Altman 
(1982: 105) notes, a recurrent theme in epistolary novels are letters as self-
fulfilling prophesies; the extratextual events are often scripted and man-
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oeuvred in letters that, at least for the unsuspecting diegetic reader, first 
appear as pure expressions of emotion. Here is Pamela·s pen at work 
again: 
(4) the unparalleled wickedness, stratagems, and devices, of those who call 
themselves gentlemen, yet pervert the designs of Providence in giving them 
ample means to do good, to their own everlasting perdition, and the ruin of 
poor oppressed innocence! (83) 
Indeed, Altman parallels Pamela·s ´artfulnessµ and Mr B·s ambivalent role 
play as her ´readerµ with the more explicit masterminding of Laclos· char-
acters: ´%·s consciousness of Pamela·s letters as her ´novel,µ their novel³
which he reads and yet is an agent in³resembles Valmont·s and Mer-
teuil·s awareness of themselves as creators and readers of their own storyµ 
(Altman 1982: 105). The above example (4) shows Pamela (again) in dis-
tress, and yet at her most authorial, occupying the discursive locus of an 
18th century intervening and judging narratorial voice. As a discursive Tro-
jan horse, she appropriates the pre-modern narratorial convention of an 
exemplum and constructs herself as the proverbial virtuous victim while sim-
ultaneously representing one. Consequently, the elements that narratologists 
lump together under the term ´expressivityµ5 such as exclamations 
´2«µ) and the breathless syntax reappear to us as means to a narrative 
end.  
 One is led to ask: why would all the ´artful slutsµ stop discursive man-
oeuvring when cast into the third person context, even though this mod-
ern position might³at a first glance³imply the narrative role of a mere 
innocent victim (of representation)?   
Unmarked FID: Downplaying of Discursive Agency and Appropriation of 
Narratorial Conventions 
Madame de Lafayette·s La Princesse de Clèves (1678), the allegedly first ´psy-
chological novelµ, plays the role of an intermediary between epistolary 
forms and modern consciousness representation. Indeed, the novel itself 
seems to be a work in progress, representing concretely the historical tran-
sition from the external to the internal focalization and from first person 
to third person experientiality. We may find one striking example that dis-
plays this change in an ingeniously formed nutshell: a letter, followed by 
an ancestral occurrence of free indirect discourse. The case is that of an 
anonymous letter which circles around the court of Henry II and arouses 
admiration and upheaval; the letter is mistakenly thought to be addressed 
                      
5  On the slackness of the narratological uses of this term, see Jongeneel 2006.  
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to the Duke of Nemours by a jealous mistress; and it misleads Madame de 
Clèves to read it as an evidence of Nemours· false-heartedness in the af-
fections he has been showing to her. 
(5) [From  the  anonymous  woman·s  letter:]  never  was  grief  equal  to  mine;  I  
thought you had the most violent passion for me, I did not conceal that 
which I had for you, and at the time that I acknowledged it  to you without 
reserve, I found that you deceived me, that you loved another, and that in all 
probability I was made a sacrifice to this new mistress. [«]I was of opinion 
that  if  anything  could  rekindle  that  flame,  it  would  be  to  let  you  see  that  
mine was extinguished, but to let you see it through an endeavour to conceal 
it from you, as if I wanted the power to acknowledge it to you: this resolu-
tion I adhered to; but what a painful decision and how difficult, once I had 
seen you again, to put into practice! (59) 
Madam de Clèves read this letter, and read it over again several times, with-
out knowing at the same time what she had read; she saw only that the Duke 
de Nemours did not love her as she imagined and that he loved others who 
were no less deceived by him than she. What a discovery was this for a per-
son in her condition, who had a violent passion, who had just given marks of 
it to a man whom she judged unworthy of it, and to another whom she used 
ill  for  his  sake!  Never  was  affliction  so  cutting  as  hers  [«]  in  short,  she  
thought of everything that could add to her grief and despair. What reflec-
tions did she not make on herself, and on the advices her mother had given 
her! How did she repent, that she had not persisted in her resolution of retir-
ing [«]. (60²61) 
The content³and more remarkably, the form³of the letter are perplexing 
enough to give rise to a pioneering narrative mode such as FID. Since this 
is but an early manifestation of the mode, the extradiegetic narrator·s em-
pathetic voice (or psycho-narration /thought report) dominates³´What a 
discovery was this«µ³and we may sense how the figural voice emerges 
only gradually from the narration: ´« and to another whom she used ill 
for his sake!µ.  It is almost as if we were let to read how FID is born as a 
result of discursive pairing between the authorial and the figural; springing 
from mere hypotheses made by the narrator, then growing towards the 
narrator·s empathizing and imitating exclamations³and gradually evolv-
ing into a discourse that actually reflects the form of thoughts as they ap-
pear to the experiencing mind.  
 Yet I would also claim that it is a justifiable interpretive move to fore-
ground the figural discursive component from the very beginning. It is the 
preceding letter that provides us with the most crucial frame: if we com-
pare the letter·s syntax and the expressions to those in the following third 








In fact, it seems that Madame de Clèves absorbs the art of the letter-writer to 
convey her own experience³the alleged uniqueness of it (´Jamais afflic-
tion n·a été si piquant et si viveµ). Yet, ironically, we as readers see the two 
women·s anxieties as juxtaposed³and as identical (´Jamais douleur n·a 
été pareille à la mienneµ). Their passions are not unique but schematic, at 
least when verbalized. The third person consciousness representation imi-
tates the passionate syntax of the letter as well as the exclamation ´Com-
bien/Que«µ³a structure that later became a conventional marker of 
free indirect discourse in French. In this early context, however, the sen-
tences such as ´Quelle vue et quelle connaissance«µ or ´combien se re-
pentit-elle«µ remain doubly-voiced in a very peculiar manner because 
they foreground both the figural expressivity and the hypothetical nature 
[The letter:] 
 
never was grief equal to mine 
Jamais douleur n·a été pareille à la mienne. 
 
I thought you had the most violent 
passion for me, I did not conceal that 
which I had for you, and at the time 
that I acknowledged it to you without 
reserve, I found that you deceived 
me, that you loved another 
Je croyais que vous aviez pour moi une pas-
sion violente; je ne vous cachais plus celle que 
M·avais pour vous et, dans le temps que je 
vous la laissais voir tout entière, j·appris que 
vous me trompiez, que vous en aimiez une 
autre  
 
this resolution I adhered to; but what 
a painful decision and how difficult, 
once I had seen you again, to put into 
practice! 
Je m·arrêtai à cette resolution; mais qu·elle 
me fut difficile à prendre, et qu·en vous re-




never was affliction so cutting as hers 




who had a violent passion, who had 
just given marks of it to a man whom 
she judged unworthy of it, and to an-
other whom she used ill for his sake! 
qui avait une passion violente, qui venait 
G·en donner des marques à un homme 
qu·elle en jugeait indigne et à un autre 
qu·elle maltraitait pour l·amour de lui! 
 
 
What reflections did she not make on 
herself, and on the advices her moth-
er had given her! How did she repent, 
that she had not persisted in her reso-
lution of retiring. 
Quels retours ne fit-elle point sur elle-même! 
quelles réflexions sur les conseils que sa mère 
lui avait donnés! Combien se repentit-elle de 
ne s·être pas opiniâtrée à se séparer du com-
merce du monde. 
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of figuralization. We could actually interpret the narrator as asking, rhetori-
cally: ´combien ²´, ´quelle vue ²´.6 
 Ultimately, the ambivalence between the narratorial and the figural 
can be seen as culminating in the sentence ´never was affliction so cutting 
as hers.µ It offers the reader a seemingly objective report of the unequal-
led emotional load of the heroine³of a woman throughout the novel 
characterized as, indeed, a sui generis case both in appearance as in charac-
ter. However, in its narrative context, the sentence gains in figural expres-
sivity at the expense of objectivity. The letter·s exemplary dame in distress 
suggests a reading where the incomparability and uniqueness of Madame 
de Clèves· shock is the heroine·s own interpretation³just as the following 
sentences are the result of her misguided conclusions (we learn later that 
the letter was not addressed to Nemours and all the emotional fuss was 
unnecessary³a fact that the chronicler-narrator of La Fayette was well 
aware of all along).  
 Moreover, such wavering between uniqueness and schematicity, be-
tween expressivity and authorial design is one of the trademarks of the 
courtly (literary) traditions in which La Fayette herself lived and from 
where she found her inspiration. As Mary Jo Muratore has noted in con-
nection of her La Fayette study, the courtly life of the 16th and  the  17th 
century was dominated by exemplaires: the perfection of one·s conduct as 
well as of one·s inner life was to be accomplished by imitating superior exam-
ples (Muratore 1994: 94²95). In La Princesse de Clèves, the virtuous heroine 
who, even after her husband·s death, rejects Nemours and dies in a mon-
astery, becomes the absolute ´exemple inimitable.µ Yet, before that it is 
the letter-writer who sets the literary example for passion and true interiori-
ty: the found letter is introduced to the court as a masterpiece both in 
writing and in sentiment, as ´the finest letter that was ever writµ. The art 
of emotion is reduced to the art of writing, and when transferred (or cop-
ied) into the third person context of Madame de Clèves· affliction, this art 
of verbally mastering one·s interiority translates into an uncanny figural 
voice, which is simultaneously the producer and the result of conscious-
ness representation.  
 We may also be reminded of Madame de Clèves· successor Emma 
Bovary and our introductory example (2) where the sentence ´Any wom-
                      
6  Indeed, a post-Lafayettean pattern of emotional letters giving rise to turbulent free indirect 
discourse can be traced from Goethe·s Elective Affinities (1809) and Austen·s Pride and Prejudice 
(1813) to Pushkin·s Eugene Onegin (1828-32). Pascal 1977: 39 offers an illustrative example 
from Goethe (but does not consider the connections between FID and the preceding episto-
lary expression): ´This last expression flowed out of his [Eduard·s] pen, not his heart. Yes, as 
he saw it on paper he began bitterly to weep. In one way or another he was to renounce the 
happiness, yes the unhappiness, of loving Ottilie!µ   
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an who had imposed such great sacrifices on herself could well be permit-
ted a few fanciesµ occurs. Might there be something similar going on in La 
Fayette·s narration, even in the seemingly most objective evaluations such 
as ´What a discovery was this for a person in her condition«µ? Another 
point of contact can be found in the example (4) where Pamela writes 
about Mr. B·s ´stratagems [«] to the ruin of poor oppressed innocence". 
Just as Pamela takes on an authorial tone in the midst of persecution and 
crisis, also Madame de Clèves and Emma gain authority for their subjec-
tive constructions by applying the narratorial convention of making a 
character (themselves) an exemplum. All the three heroines are ´Mistress-
es of romantic Invention,µ as Richardson·s Mr. B would put it, and derive 
the language of their experience from literary exempla; yet only one of 
them is writing. 
 
The rub with FID is, as noted by several literary theorists, that more than 
often it appears as unmarked by linguistic or expressive signals, and yet 
does not go unnoticed by the readers. As Cohn herself points out, FID is 
still relatively easy to tell apart from other modes of consciousness repre-
sentation but often impossible to distinguish from the allegedly reliable 
narratorial report (Cohn 1978: 106). Sentences such as ´Never was afflic-
tion so cutting as hersµ or ´Any woman who had imposed such sacrifices 
on herself«µ jumble the logic of mimesis and diegesis, of figural and au-
thorial (cf. Ginsburg 1982 and Ron 1981). What has gone largely unno-
ticed is the fact that narrative literature teems with ´artful bitchesµ³
characters in the diegetic fictional worlds³who take advantage of this 
available discursive loophole in order to establish their own idiosyncratic 
version as a preferable truth.  
 Roy Pascal·s commentary on what he calls ´narrative usurpationµ 
crystallizes the uneasiness that narratologists experience with such disre-
spect towards the hierarchy of voices. When analyzing consciousness rep-
resentation in Madame Bovary, Pascal fixes his critical eye on descriptions 
of Emma·s sensations that are too artistically accomplished to render a re-
alistic image of Emma·s imagination. (Pascal 1977: 103²111) Furthermore, 
when approaching modernist texts, Pascal recognizes the opposite tendency:  
to give the figural voice the persuasiveness and apparent authority of nar-
rator·s discourse. Yet Pascal is reluctant to theorize this phenomenon any 
further in the framework of his ´dual voice hypothesisµ. (Ibid. 108) As 
McHale (1978b: 400) notes, Pascal fails to appreciate Flaubert·s resistance 
to ´the interpretive strategy by which we assign impressionism to a char-
acter·s visionµ. As I have been trying to demonstrate, this narratological 
disinclination towards thematically potential narrative takeovers is mani-
fest in its reverse meaning as well, as the ´easy access fallacyµ. Yet the au-
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thorization and pseudo-communicativeness of figural voices are not mere-
ly stylistic blunders that dilute the effects of psychological realism: they are 
the paradoxical essence of psychological realism.  
 Such downplaying of discursive agency is thematically and formally 
titillating precisely because it momentarily deconstructs what is conven-
tionally regarded as the communicational hierarchy of the literary nar-
rative. Furthermore, these loopholes are in a contrapuntal relationship to 
the evolution of recurrent literary themes: the double standards of virtue 
(Pamela); the conflict between individual experientiality and shared con-
ventions of narrativization (La Princesse de Clèves); or the anxiety of lang-
uage and literary communication (Madame Bovary). Thus the impression of 
a figural consciousness ´writing their own novelµ should not be regarded 
merely as a discursive side effect; on the contrary, the figure of the pseu-
do-hysterical ´artful slutµ or that of the ´(over)narrativizing focalizerµ are 
recurrent literary tropes produced in the interplay between narrative tech-
niques and thematic foregrounding.   
 Every time one addresses overlapping discourses in a novel one name 
should³and will³come up: the indie-theorist Bakhtin is closely connec-
ted to the arguments I am defending in this article. For Bakhtin, as well,  
novelistic techniques are deeply rooted in writing³and silent reading 
which leaves the construction of voice(s) to the reader (Bakhtin 1981: 3; 
see also Lock 2001: 7-77).7 It has been suggested that Bakhtin is, in fact, 
more ´graphocentricµ than Derrida (Robert Cunliffe, cited in Lock 2001: 
71). Yet what prevents me from simply embracing Bakhtin·s dialogism 
and accepting a sentence such as ´Any woman who had imposed such 
great sacrifices on herself could well be permitted a few fanciesµ as a mere 
locus of an eternal heteroglossia, of an unresolved play of subjectivities 
(cf. Bakhtin 1981: 324-325; ´another speech in another·s languageµ; see 
also Grishakova in this volume) is that the Bakhtinian angle to double-
voicedness ignores the interplay between the ´freedomµ of free indirect 
discourse and the suggested hierarchy of narrative agents that contravenes 
it. In my view, the most significant novelistic dialogue is conducted be-
tween the possibility and the impossibility of dialogue between narrative 
agents on different diegetic levels; it is the hierarchical backdrop of novel-
istic communication against which the discursive freedom³or the unen-
cumbered nature of the written word³is played. Consequently, as much 
as  I  sympathize  with Lars-Åke Skalin·s  arguments  in  the present  volume 
on the peculiarity of fictional (non-)communication, I cannot fully em-
                      
7  The Bakhtinian notions about the novel as an emphatically written genre tie in with the early 
theories of free indirect discourse as ´unspeakableµ and as such (exclusively) a novelistic 
mode (see Bally 1912 and 1914, Voloäinov 1986: 136-159 , see also Lock 2001: 80-83).   
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brace his notion of third-person literary narratives as elementarily tellerless: 
the uncanny intentionality and rhetorical design of figural voices is created 
in a dynamic dialogue with the constructed narratorial position. Further-
more, the thematic potential of narrative usurpation and exploitation at-
tests to the readerly intuition of an underlying structure of voices. To inter-
pret Emma Bovary or the Princess of Clèves as ´artful slutsµ reaching for 
narrative authority is to presuppose an ´upperµ and a ´lowerµ discursive 
agency (the authority of the narratorial report and the controversiality of 
local truths). In short, we cannot say that literary discourse or literary in-
terpretation is a play if we do not recognize the bricks with which one 
plays; and the alleged hierarchical structure, to my mind, is one of the 
most fundamental bricks.  
 
At this point it may be warranted to turn to a late modern text which ob-
viously flaunts the figural discursive takeover, bringing heterodiegetic nar-
ratorial functions to the verge of omission³and we should turn to this 
narrative precisely in order to reflect on the interpretive effects it shares 
with the allegedly more authorial ´traditionalµ novels and their convent-
ional use of free indirect discourse.  
 J.M. Coetzee·s Disgrace (1999) begins with an iterative framing of the 
protagonist·s habitualities as a 52-year old divorcé: 
(6) For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the 
problem of sex rather well.  [«]  Soraya is tall and slim, with long black hair 
and dark, liquid eyes. Technically he is old enough to be her father; but then, 
technically, one can be a father at twelve. He has been on her books for over 
a year; he finds her entirely satisfactory. (1) 
In all its innovativeness, Coetzee·s novel is indebted to the long tradition 
of those ambiguous figural voices that appear as if ´narratedµ inside 
someone·s head and yet being caught in the middle of their experiential 
confusion.8 The contradictory effect is amplified by the use of present 
tense and unpredictable changes between singular and iterative narration. 
Thus the literary frame of epistolary tension between experiencing and 
transcribing (or fabulating) lives on even more forcefully than in conven-
tional FID narration. The Coetzeean present-tense-third-person narrative 
situation allows for exquisite changes from temporarily unanchored inter-
pretation and value judgements (´He is all for double lives, triple lives, 
lives lived in compartmentsµ (6)) to reports on singulative, temporarily 
marked sequences (´Then one Saturday morning everything changesµ (6)). 
                      
8  As in the double temporality reflected in a sentence describing a filmed dance performance, 
Lurie is showing to his young student mistress: ´the instant of the present and the past of 
that instant, evanescent, caught in the same spaceµ. (15) 
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Yet many thought acts of the protagonist David Lurie are left lingering 
between iterative and singulative. Especially his (reoccurring?) moments 
of insight (´His needs turn out to be quite light, after all, light and fleeting, 
like those of a butterflyµ (5)) are a constant source of ambiguity: is he real-
ly a master of his existentially lingering way of life, or is his confusion only 
shallowly covered by his eloquence?  
 Temporal changes and third person reference suggest extradiegetic 
manoeuvring behind the scenes of Disgrace: in fact, at a first blush, the nar-
rative situation resembles conventional psycho-narration. In the same 
conventional vein, the present tense reinforces the protagonist·s role as 
the receiver of unmediated sensations and not as a retrospective organizer 
of experience. By definition, then, we should have the extradiegetic narra-
tor to verbalize, organize and summarize the thoughts of the focal charac-
ter in a manner typical of analytic psycho-narration³even if occasionally 
resorting to free indirect quotation of thoughts already verbalized in the 
character·s mind. Narratorial functions are not the way to approach the 
ambiguities in Coetzee·s narration, however. Any classical approach to the 
use of free indirect discourse or psycho-narration in this novel would find 
ample evidence of both sympathy and irony towards the inner life of Lu-
rie, but it would be redundant to attribute these stances to narratorial in-
tentions, since Lurie himself, a professor of literature and communication, 
seems perfectly capable of being the empathizer as well as the shrewdest 
ironizer of his own discourse³and more troublingly, the apparently ´nar-
ratorialµ discourse. A recurring stylistic feature in the narration of Lurie·s 
experiential flux is a search after le mot juste: ´a moderate bliss, a moderated 
blissµ (6), ´this daughter, this womanµ (62), ´to pass him tools³to be his 
handlanger, in factµ (136), ´Her hips and breasts are now (he searches for 
the best word) ampleµ (59). This apparently hesitant verbalization of expe-
rience gives rise to contradictory effects, that of almost autistic repetition 
and that of intentional poeticization: ´A ready learner, compliant, pliantµ 
(5).  The  mind  of  Lurie  appears  both  as  an  unedited  flux  and  as  a  con-
scious, even artistically motivated editor of language.  
 If we take another look at the beginning of Disgrace, we may notice 
how the authorial schematization of one·s own experience, already at play 
in the minds of Emma, Pamela and Madame de Clèves, is given another 
ironic twist. The focalizer-character·s tendency to assume narratorial activ-
ities is clear from the outset: the conventional expositionary mode that in-
troduces the protagonist with the help of  familiar  categories  (´a  man  of  
his age, fifty-two, divorcedµ) is already focalized through Lurie: internal 
focalization is indexed by the absence of the protagonist·s name (´«he 
has, to his mind«µ). Moreover, as we read on, we conclude that the evo-
cation of prototypes and even the reference to the subjective nature of 
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this ´good solutionµ (´to his mindµ) are in fact the first evidence of the 
protagonist·s ability to self-ironical distancing. Again, as in the example (1) 
from Madame Bovary or in the anguish of the Princess of Clèves, we may 
notice how the figural mind exploits the convention of psycho-narration 
by transforming the markers of indirectness into figural self-reflection on 
one·s own cognitive processes (cf. ´His needs turn out to be quite light, 
after allµ; see Ron 1981: 35).  
 
Here, as well as with the earlier examples, one is reminded of Fludernik·s 
inspiring study on schematic language representation. In short, Fludernik 
claims that representation of speech and thought relies on mechanisms of 
schematization and typification (based on cognitive prototype modelling). 
Whenever narrative reproduces an utterance, mental or oral, it is not ac-
tually a matter of reproduction but of construction.  As  Fludernik  demon-
strates, this construction relies on approximation, on rendering utterances 
and expressive features that are likely within certain situational and narra-
tive frames. It is through ´typicalµ markers of expressivity that the illusion 
of a figural voice is projected into the narration. (Fludernik 1993: 398-408 
and passim.) Consequently, in the context of fictional consciousness repre-
sentation, schematization and typification are considered narratorial func-
tions. Yet in the cases of our artful focalizers³the Princess of Clèves, 
Emma Bovary, or David Lurie³schematization appears (on the level of 
our quasi-mimetic interpretation) as intended by the characters them-
selves; they seem to want to evoke markers of interiority that are some-
how representative of something they identify with³more or less willing-
ly (´Technically he is old enough to be her father; but then, technically, 
one can be a father at twelveµ). These examples seem to suggest that stylis-
tically, the mechanisms of typification and schematization are malleable 
and often attributable to the alleged intentions of the focalizing characters.  
 Schematization and typification of one·s own ´narrativeµ and one·s 
own experiences demonstrate how narrator as function can be turned into 
narrator as style. Richard Aczel·s study on narrative voice (to my mind, one 
of the most progressive ones in the field) moves towards a more textually 
oriented approach by emphasizing the recognition of narratorial idiom 
(Aczel 1998: 467-468). Aczel maintains that in FID, the voice of the narra-
tor is identifiable only through its absence, as ´voice-different-fromµ (ibid. 
478). Thus the system of voices in a narrative text is a system of differ-
ences: the narratorial idiom is identified through its deviation from the 
figural voice (ibid. 478, 494)³and vice versa. However, Aczel continues 
in the familiar narratological vein by assigning intentional discursive agen-
cy almost exclusively to the narrator and not to the figural voice.  
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 If we follow Aczel·s argument on the centrality of stylistic differences 
all the way through, we may conclude that a figural voice that attempts to 
deconstruct these differences by incorporating narratorial conventions 
into its own discourse also upends the power relations of this system: the 
resident of the diegetic world appears, if only momentarily, as the organ-
izer of the discursive and narrative elements of her own story. Thus in the 
case of Emma Bovary·s fancies (example 1), the context works reversely 
to Aczel·s theory of voice-as-difference: Emma·s subjective attempt to 
frame and narrativize her own motives is nested³chameleon-like³within 
the objective report on her moods and behaviour. One of the hackneyed 
definitions of FID has been its naturalization as narratorial mimicry. One 
step towards deconstructing such reductionist interpretations is offered by 
focalizers who create the interpretive illusion of mimicking the narratorial 
style: they use seemingly objective qualifiers, distance themselves from 
their experience, dissolve their subjectivity into generalizations; replace 
self-reference with authority. In such narrative situations, the absence of 
expressivity creates the subjective experientiality by negation. As Fludernik 
remarks about FID, ´there is a deliberate attempt to erase stylistic differ-
ence, the difference between background and foregroundµ (Fludernik 
1993: 331). The only expansion I would suggest to Fludernik·s argument is 
that there might be a deliberate attempt³not just on the narrator·s side, 
as Fludernik suggests, but on both sides. Or, stripped from any narrative 
illusions, this is the uncanny interpretive effect created by the absence of 
agency markers (´Emma thoughtµ) and the contravening default under-
standing of narrative voices as hierarchically structured. 
 Such reading of narrative style and of the objective-expressive binary 
opposition would also potentially upend the conventional reading of the 
Uncle Charles Principle (Kenner 1978) as ´linguistic parodyµ of the otherwise 
anti-colloquial narrator (cf. Fludernik 1993: 332). In fact, Lucy Ferriss· 
recent article on UCP is already well ahead in doing this when she coins 
the term APP, named after the short story ´A&Pµ by Updike. In short, 
APP is UPP·s counterpart in first person fiction and in internally focalized 
narrative, referring to the contagion of the (otherwise colloquial) charac-
ter-narrator·s or focalizer·s language by authorial (literary, well-formed, 
persuasive) idiom (Ferriss 2008: 185). The most notable difference be-
tween my own arguments and Ferriss· concerns the interpretive effects of 
ambiguous discursive agency. Ferriss encapsulates her own idea by sug-
gesting that authors lending their authorial idiom to their characters· dis-
cursive plane ´are saying, in effect: ¶However idiosyncratic my character 
may appear, however broken-off his or her world, we can connect and 
unify it if we only supply the right language·µ (ibid. 190). In my interpreta-
tion, however, the uncanniness of the figural voice persists and the ´ex-
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change of syntactic structuresµ (ibid. 185) never really ceases, and this in-
stability of the figural voice as  a  vehicle  of experientiality continues to be thema-
tically productive.  
 
In Coetzee·s novel, these ambiguities of voice and authority are deeply 
entangled with the major theme of confession and remorse. Lurie refuses 
to express public contrition for his having an affair with a young student, 
but, along with the story, is made to feel remorse for an entire post-
apartheid nation as well as for his own sex. This ethically unstable position 
is reflected in the narration: Lurie is established as the only focalizer of 
events that seem to pass by as an uncontrollable present-tense flow, and 
yet it seems that it is his figural voice that controls the narrative discourse 
in a poignantly literary fashion, as if in artistically motivated retrospect. In 
fact, this ethically unstable positioning of voice comes very close to re-
sembling the notorious first-person fabulator Humbert Humbert who, as 
the leading theorist of character (i.e. first-person) narration James Phelan 
has noted, is able to turn the discourse into a story;  
Nabokov is using Humbert·s act of telling as itself part of the represented action 
of the novel, a present-tense story running parallel to the past tense story of 
Humbert and Dolores [«] More specifically, Nabokov uses this present-tense 
story to add a significant layer to the whole narrative: the ethical struggle of 
Humbert the Narrator. (Phelan 2005: 121) 
Perhaps due to his emphasis on homodiegetic narration, Phelan·s rhetori-
cal poetics ignores the uncanny role of third person focalizers in narrative 
communication ² and thus all the ´living to tell about itµ that has no dis-
cernible speaker function attached to it.9 Yet if we consider the narration 
of Disgrace in the light of Phelan·s reading of Lolita, we may notice a simi-
lar tension between being in the middle of things and the re-evaluation of 
that experience. It is through this tension that the focalizer David Lurie, 
the man in the middle of things (increasingly awful things, as we learn) just 
happening to him, at the same time resembles an informed narrator, yet 
not extradiegetic and not even an intradiegetic one since there is no outer 
narratorial frame in the classically hierarchical sense; no signifying differ-
ence between the extradiegetic and the figural voice arises from the dis-
course (cf. ´There is still Soraya. He ought to close that chapter. Instead, 
he pays a detective agency to track her down.µ (9)). The persuasiveness of 
Lurie·s evaluations and self-irony creates a communicational fallacy and 
makes the boundary between homo- and heterodiegetic narration seem 
artificial. A literary mind such as Lurie is even likely to use the third per-
                      
9  For a critique of the narratological ´standard theory of narrative transmissionµ, see Skalin 
2005, and also Nielsen·s article in this volume.   
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son to refer to himself. His evident intertextual counterpart Humbert 
Humbert, who, at the moment of the death of Lolita·s mother and Hum-
bert·s wife, assumes the third person perspective of others who mistakenly 
treat him as a mourning widower, provides a plausible model.  
 An interpretive leap from the third to the first person may find sup-
port from some postclassical studies on the so-called simultaneous narra-
tion (first-person-present-tense; Cohn 1999: 96-108, and Hansen 2008), a 
mode familiar from, among many others, Coetzee·s Waiting for the Barbari-
ans (1980). Per Krogh Hansen continues Dorrit Cohn·s work on simulta-
neous narration by pointing out some interpretive challenges that the un-
natural combination of immediacy and mediacy sets forth; this is what he 
notes about one of his compelling exemplary texts: ´>«] even though 
[the] text is so obviously marked as ¶narrated· [«] one cannot consider 
this as a sign of a narratorial or authorial instance beyond the character-
narrator, even though the latter occupies a non-naturalizable narrational 
situationµ (Hansen  2008:  327).  At  a  first glance, Lurie seems to occupy 
this same untenable position, yet one is tempted to think that precisely the 
use of third person is crucial here and the meanings and aesthetic effects 
of Disgrace would not survive translation to first person. In order to create 
the illusion of a discursive takeover³which, thematically, seems to gener-
ate from a mixture of denial, defence, literary sensibility and literary obses-
sion³the narrative situation needs to cast the shadow of a possible au-
thority (the heterodiegetic ´presenceµ) towards which the diegetic discurs-
ive agent is reaching through narratively and stylistically ´authorizingµ 
strategies. What strikes me as an interesting difference between Hansen·s 
and my own examples has to do with the stylistic effects: Hansen·s first-
person-present-tense create ´a disturbing apathetic senseµ and indicate 
incapability of narrative framing (at least in psychological or ethical terms), 
whereas my examples from epistolary narration, canonical third-person 
FID and Disgrace display narrative overcapacity and disturbing eloquence in a 
narrative position which, by definition, should be that of an unwilling and 
unconscious mediator (cf. Yacobi 1981: 123-124,  2005). In fact, these 
anti-narrators betray such crafty design in their flux of experience that not 
only we experience narrativity, we get the sense of writing.  
 
As Henrik Skov Nielsen demonstrates in the present volume, one of the 
pitfalls of structuralist narratology is its mostly unchallenged reliance on 
pronominal reference even in fictional contexts. Yet I think that a ques-
tioning of the conventional functions of third- and first-person reference 
should not lead to a conclusion that the pronouns ´,µ and ´(s)heµ would 
in any literary context be interchangeable. Just as narrative takeovers and 
usurpations presuppose a hierarchy of voices, similarly it is the conven-
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tional use of pronouns and their reference functions that provide the 
ground for the uncannily narrativizing and quasi-communicating figural 
voices. Only through violation can they create a sense of structural loop-
holes and question the fixed statuses of the constructor and the construct-
ed.  
 Meir Sternberg has reminded us of the varying degrees of communica-
tiveness of textual agents and their awareness of their function as narrative 
mediators: ´>«] discoursers in narrative polarize (or shuttle) between tell-
ers and informants: those who communicate with another about the 
world, as against those who lead their secret life and unwittingly mediate 
in the process another·s higher-level communicationµ (Sternberg 2005: 
233). Although Sternberg rightly points out that the discourser·s status is 
flexible,  he  does  not  look  into  cases  in  which  the  leaders  of  secret  lives  
reflect communicative features in their discourse. Literary narratives do 
not only demonstrate the fact that evocation of a voice is always in some 
measure an evocation of communicativeness: this loophole in structure 
opens up new thematic possibilities. Such techniques foreground the lin-
guistic and literary mediacy at work in the human mind; and furthermore, 
display the nature of fictional minds as overly verbalized and over-
determined in their verbal design.10 Consequently, I find it fundamentally 
counterintuitive when Tamar Yacobi writes that the ´purely informative 
statusµ of Emma Bovary and other subjects of consciousness representa-
tion ´makes [them] the diametric opposite of the invariably self-conscious 
author, a passive participant in the text·s communicative processµ (Yacobi 
1987: 338).  
 I should think that cognitive narratology would have the potential to 
go beyond the hierarchization of voices and explore the readerly effects of 
the ultimate multi-voicedness of literary communication. Yet it seems that 
cognitive narratologists are too keen on keeping their feet on the oral and 
naturally social ground of storytelling to address the sort of discursive fore-
grounding in fictional minds that I have been after in this article.11 When 
Lisa Zunshine (very persuasively) suggests that ´fictional narratives [«] 
rely on, manipulate, and titillate our tendency to keep track of who 
thought, wanted, and felt what and whenµ (2006: 5), she does not consider 
the manipulative effects that are brought along to consciousness represen-
tation by multi-level verbalization and narrativization processes. The 
                      
10  Cf. Jahn 1996: 247: ´Interior monologues may indeed have a quality of ´voice,µ but this is 
only because thought has a quality of voice, and not because thought equals voice or is a 
kind of voice, let alone a narrative voice.µ  
11  More on this skepticism towards the study of fictional minds in cognitive narratology can be 
found in an article where I study the phenomenon of characters constructing each other·s 
minds³a topic that is closely related to the current one. (Mäkelä 2006) 
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downplaying of discursive agency in FID is designed against our meta-repre-
sentational capacity and is not reducible to formulaic representations such 
as ´X interprets that Y tells that A assumes B to think«µ and so on. As 
Michael Peled Ginsburg notes well before any narratological Theory of 
Mind applications, ´[FID] deserves our attention because it makes explicit 
the fundamental characteristic of discourse in the novel, its double focus, 
its existence both as a representation of an object and as in itself an object 
of representationµ (Ginsburg 1982: 140). Thus a formulaic representation 
is bound to run into its own impossibility (´X interprets/tells/assumes/-
represents/is Xµ?). 
 Another persuasive point is made by Palmer, who criticizes classical 
narratology for its internal speech bias and calls for a more holistic ap-
proach to fictional minds as embodied and as social constructs (Palmer 
2004: 9-12). Especially Palmer·s critique of classical narratology·s ´speech 
category approachµ (the dissection of narration into direct, indirect and 
free indirect discourse) is well deserved, as already mentioned earlier. 
However, again something is lost with the bathwater: the fact that literary 
minds are verbally biased, they consist of nothing but language. We hear 
unuttered, even unintended sentences communicating to us. 
A Short Conclusion: Fictions of Authority 
This article has been an attempt to rehabilitate the role of the figural voice 
as a quasi-intentional discursive agency. I have suggested that readerly in-
tuition finds nothing alarming in fictional minds that speak to them, per-
suade them and try to convince them of the legitimacy of their own inter-
pretations³these features can be found at the very heart of literary con-
ventions. Yet there seems to be no berth for such unnatural textual agen-
cies in narratological reasoning. The shift from classical to postclassical 
narratology has not significantly altered the hierarchically driven standard 
assumptions about narrative communication and about the fixedness of 
the levels of intentionality in narrative discourse.  
 Yet the history of figural masterminding goes way back and is already 
thematized and even parodied by the 18th century epistolary fictions. The 
voice of an unmediated experience is shown to run into its own impossi-
bility and is replaced by a subjectivity that reflects its own intermediary 
position both as a textual construct and as a textual constructor. By the 
emergence of modern novelistic practices, the status of the figural voice 
has been further complicated, since, in terms of naturally occurring human 
communication and cognition, it has become incommunicable. As a re-
sult, this experiential ambiguity is reflected in structural uncertainty³to a 
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point where the entire notion of the structure of voices becomes debata-
ble. 
 Ultimately,  my  argument  does  not  so  much  spring  from  an  urge  to  
criticize existing narratological categories as it is inspired by the multiple 
ways fictional minds seem to reflect, shadow, challenge and even carnival-
ize the upper level construction processes³literary creation, the narrative 
act, and finally, the act of literary interpretation. Yet this is also a bilateral 
manoeuvre: since the reader is the final constructor of voices, we need to 
suppose that there is indeed a readerly interest in reading figural voices 
against the cognitive or the communicative grain³a willingness to de-
familiarize the fictional mind. As Henrik Skov Nielsen notes in the pre-
sent volume, ´the question is whether the reader will always try to natural-
ize anything³and if so, if it can always be done successfully.µ  
 Yet another contributor to the present volume, Rolf Reitan suggests 
several interpretive effects set forth by the use of narrative ´youµ as both 
reference and address; what to me seems to be the most appealing of the-
se interpretations is to regard the narratorial voice in second person narra-
tives as ´some version of the creator·s voice talking (no, not talking to) his 
creation, or more accurately, writing his creationµ (Reitan in the present 
volume,  italics  in  the  original).  Here  Reitan  is  going  where  I  would  also  
like  to go:  a  step further  from naturalizing literary  communication and a  
step towards acknowledging the uncanny shadows that the literary terms of 
existence cast across imagined worlds and minds. As Nielsen reminds the 
narratological community in the wake of an interdisciplinary explosion, 
the peculiarity of fictional representation is the result of the paradoxical 
fact that ´[a] work of fiction creates the world to which it refers by refer-
ring to itµ (Nielsen 2004: 145).12 Figural voices suggest that, in a way, this 
goes for literary experientiality as well: a verbalized fictional mind bears in 
itself the process of its own twofold genesis, that is, writing and reading as 
literary constructions.    
                      
12  A point originally made by Käte Hamburger; see also Cohn 1999: 12-13.  
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